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THE LUBBOCK CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
THE NEW DEAL, AND THE ROPESVILLE
RESETTLEMENT PROJECT

WILLIAM eLAYSON

US Highway 62 crosses the town of Ropes-

sealed irrigation wells. These farmsteads are
the remains of a rural community project constructed by the federal government during the
Great Depression for the resettlement of
seventy-six impoverished farm families. The
Ropesville Project was one of ninety-nine that
were planned and built by the New Deal's controversial community building program. These
communities were initiated during the early
stages of the New Deal by the Division of Subsistence Homesteads of the Department of the
Interior, then taken over by the Rural Rehabilitation Division of the Federal Emergency
Relief Administration (FERA). In 1935, the
two agencies were transferred to the Resettlement Administration (RA) which was replaced
by the Farm Security Administration (FSA)
in 1937. 1 These programs, founded on a variety of social and economic theories and ideals,
were all based on the belief that rational planning could guarantee a humane, democratic,
and egalitarian way of life on the land. While
the history of the Ropesville Project reveals
much about the community building program,
life as a resettlement client, and the long term
effects of New Deal social planning, the paper
that follows is primarily concerned with the

ville, population 480, between Lubbock and
Brownfield on the South Plains of Texas. To
the north and west of town, scattered among
the suburban-style homes of contemporary
farmers, stand several dozen small cottages of
identical design. Some are still occupied, many
nothing more than ruins, and a few have been
added on to, stuccoed, or provided a screened
porch. All are surrounded by cotton fields and
most are accompanied by ramshackle outbuildings, rusted tractors, dormant windmills, and
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project's beginnings-particularly the involvement of the Lubbock Chamber of Commerce
in its initial development. This story exposes
a hidden interaction between the ideals of the
New Deal community program, the ambitions
of elites on the local level, and the realities of
farming on the South Plains.
The resettlement community building program was the most ambitious and controversial effort launched by the New Deal to
rehabilitate the rural poor. The communities
were to provide settlers with a lifestyle few
American farmers had experienced, including
homes with modern plumbing and electricity;
freedom from the constant threat of eviction
because of market vagaries or climate; financial security for the future; and educational
and cultural facilities as an integral part of
community life.
Although the New Deal community program is commonly associated with radical
left-wing economist Rexford Tugwell and his
Resettlement Administration, the concept for
rural resettlement communities was proposed
by agricultural economist M.L. Wilson of
Montana State College. His plan called for
"subsistence homestead" communities, in
which settlers would grow food on small plots
of land while they earned wages in decentralized rural industries. Residents of such subsistence communities would not add to the
surpluses of commercial agriculture markets,
but would have the means to feed themselves
in economic downturns. The plan would also
secure for them a part of the vanishing rural
lifestyle that Wilson admired. 2
The plan seemed communistic to local and
congressional conservatives. For every supporter, there was an opponent who doubted
industry could be lured to the countryside.
The Division of Subsistence Homesteads of
the Department of the Interior, established by
executive order in August of 1933 with Wilson as chief, drew criticism because of high
costs and the federal government's strict control over the development of the communities. Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes
insisted local control would invite graft while

his opponents felt that local control offered
flexibility. An alternative to tight federal control was offered by the Division of Rural Rehabilitation of the FERA in 1934. 3 The FERA's
rural rehabilitation plan was to be administered on the state level by corporations managed by a board of directors comprised of
prominent agriculturalists, educators, and businessmen. Most of the funds were earmarked
for direct loans to individual farmers, but the
construction of "rural-industrial" resettlement
communities in drought areas, the cut-over
regions of the Great Lakes, and the coal mining regions of the Appalachians and Ozarks
was a small, but significant, part of the FERA's
program. 4
The FERA's plan was similar to the subsistence homesteads concept except rural industrial communities would balance cooperative
farming and.cooperative industry. Small family plots for subsistence would combine with
wage work on large-scale communal farms and
cooperative industrial enterprises. FERA communities were less expensive than their predecessors because resettlement clients themselves
built homes and community buildings. s According to Lawrence Westbrook, FERA administrator in Texas and later assistant to
director Harry Hopkins, the FERA projects
were to be modeled on the "closely knit communities which were established by North
European and Scandinavian colonists according to the European farm village system" because these immigrants seemed able to take
care of themselves without having to go on
relief. Westbrook believed homes, health and
sanitation facilities, recreational and educational opportunities, and assistance in establishing community industrial enterprises
would, in the long run, cost less than direct
relief payments. 6
Texas Rural Communities, Incorporated,
the agency responsible for distributing FERA
funds in Texas, announced a "rural colonization plan" in early February 1934.7 According
to A.B. Davis, manager of the Lubbock Chamber of Commerce, chamber members "were
convinced that the idea was ... one of the few
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FIG . 1. Typical homestead on Ropesville Project, 1936. Courtesy Southwest Collection, Texas Tech
University, Lubbock, Texas. Photo collection #61.

worthwhile proposed experiments in the New
Deal ... that had been thought of that would
actually rehabilitate humans instead of doping them with the dole."8 The FERA's
rural-industrial communities plan might solve
the problem the South Plains had-how to
develop about five million acres of unplowed
arable virgin land. 9
The South Plains in the early thirties
showed a stronger resemblance to the cattle
kingdom it had been than the cotton kingdom
it was slowly becoming. Less than half a century had passed since the Comanches and the
great buffalo herds had been driven from the
region and there were still a few old cowboys
around to tell about the land before fences,
roads, or towns. Except for the oil that lay

largely untapped beneath the buffalo grass and
mesquite, the only natural resource the Llano
Estacado had to offer potential settlers was
land. By the beginning of the Depression, the
vast majority of this land remained unplowed
and the relatively few pioneer families that
were farming on the South Plains in 1930 had
migrated to the region during the teens and
twenties. In Lubbock County, the most populous of all South Plains counties, farms increased from 208 in 1910 to 2495 in 1930,
while improved acres increased from 838 to
370,512. 10 Although this rapid rise in agricultural development was accompanied by a rise
in the population as a whole, the region maintained a frontier character well into the twentieth century. As late as 1940, horses remained
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FIG. 2. Hired tractor operator cultivating, undated . Courtesy Southwest Collection, Texas Tech University,
Lubbock, Texas. Photo collection #61.

a common mode of transportation, and many
families still lived in sod dugouts without
plumbing or electricity.
Agricultural development came late to the
South Plains primarily because of the area's
unpredictable weather. Like the rest of the
region between the ninety-eighth meridian
and the Rockies, the South Plains is semiarid,
neither "halfway between humid and arid, [nor]
half dry or half wet," and in some years "wet or
dry at wrong times from the standpoint of agricultural productions and yields." Carl
Kraenzel called the unpredictable precipitation on the Great Plains the "undefinable aspect of semi-aridity" that made farming a risky
business. I I
Settlers were attracted to the Llano
Estacado during the teens and twenties when

rainfall was adequate for farming. 12 Migration
accelerated throughout the twenties. The
Great Crash had no immediate effect on most
farmers in the region, but the drought, dust,
and lack of income that came in the years to
follow were disastrous. Throughout these difficult times local people retained faith in the
land. Each year they were certain that the rains
would return-along with magnificent crop
yields. While agricultural economists in Washington were recommending severe cutbacks
in production and retirement of submarginal
lands, Lubbock area boosters were endeavoring to open up millions of acres of virgin South
Plains land to farming.
A. B. Davis and the Lubbock Chamber of
Commerce were painfully aware of the difficulties presented by the South Plains climate,
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FIG. 3. Harvesting sorghum, undated. Courtesy Southwest Collection, Texas Tech University, Lubbock,
Texas. Photo collection #61.

but what they deemed more important was
the potential the region had when there was
enough rain. West Texas had few of the problems, such as Johnson grass and boll weevils,
that plagued more humid cotton growing areas,
and the millions of acres that surrounded Lubbock could easily be converted to crop land. It
seemed irrational to the prominent Lubbockites to allow such land to remain unplowed
indefinitely because of temporary droughts.
Historian Donald Worster has suggested that
drought is an "inevitable fact of life" of the
semiarid Great Plains. Most Lubbockites of
the 1930s would have agreed but, like the
perennial optimists Worster studied in southwest Kansas and the Oklahoma-Texas Panhandle region, they also believed that rain
would inevitably return. I3

What was needed was a means to provide
farm income during the droughts. Davis believed the FERA rural-industrial communities plan of early February 1934 was the
solution. To take advantage of this opportunity the chamber appointed a Local Advisory
Committee to "investigate and recommend"
on a proposed "New Deal Colony" for the
South Plains. The resultant plan had one primary objective-to serve as a model for large
landowners of the region to develop their extensive unplowed holdings. 14
The most active members of the Local
Advisory Committee came from the trained
and experienced faculty of recently established
Texas Technological College. Dean A. B.
Leidigh of the Division of Agriculture had
grown up on a farm in Hutchison, Kansas,
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received his graduate education from Texas
A&M, and served as head of the USDA experiment station at Amarillo during the teens.
W. L. Stangel, head of the animal husbandry
department, had been raised in Stangelville,
Wisconsin, had a master's degree in animal
husbandry from the University of Missouri,
and had served on the faculty at Texas A&M
before coming to T ech. 1s President Knapp, by
far the most influential and involved member
of the committee, was the son of Seaman
Knapp, founder of the demonstration service
of the USDA. He had been raised in Iowa,
educated at Vanderbilt University, and had
gained his experience running a plantation in
Louisiana. Before becoming Tech's second
president, Knapp had served on the faculty at
Alabama Polytechnic College (now Auburn
University) and Oklahoma A&M.16 More important than Knapp's experience, however,
was his position as chairman of the board of
directors for Texas Rural Communities. Other
members of the committee included agriculturalists Don L. Jones, administrator of Texas
A&M's Lubbock experiment station, and P.T.
Monfort, Lubbock County extension agent.
From the business s~ctor came S. A. Wells, a
prominent area merchant, and Judge R. C.
Hopping, author and real estate manager for
Ellwood Farms, Incorporated, the company
responsible for colonizing the mammoth Spade
Ranch. Finally, there was A. B. Davis, who
was described as "a ring tail tooter and a driver
who could cuss louder than any man twice
his size." The chamber manager played an invaluable role in relations with the public, the
press, and state and federal officialsY
The committee members and the chamber
of commerce were convinced that Lubbock
would benefit greatly from a successful, highly
publicized federal project in the region. The
committee submitted a twenty-five page application to Texas Rural Communities, outlining their plans for a project and advertising
the benefits of farming in the Lubbock area.
The project would take one hundred families
"permanently out of the industrial channels

of the towns and cities and return them to
farm life." Committee members even hoped:
the government would extend the program,
such extension being unlimited because of
the five million acres of fine, fertile, tillable agricultural land yet to go under the
plow on the South Plains [and that} the
large landowners of the section might be
induced to follow suit, thus more intensively developing the section. IS
Dr. Knapp's position on the Texas Rural Communities board of directors probably guaranteed acceptance of the committee's application.
It was officially approved before the end February 1934. 19
The Chamber of Commerce hoped a successful resettlement project would achieve
three goals. First, it would be a living advertisement of the benefits' of farm settlement
on the South Plains and a working demonstration of the quality of the region's only
natural resource-land. Second, it would show
large landowners of the region how to colonize their own holdings, attracting new settlers, thus increasing the tax base and greatly
improving business. zo Last and most important, the members of the committee hoped
the labor pool a large community of small farmers might provide would attract industry to
the region. 21
The committee's plan was a modification
ofFERA's rural-industrial communities. FERA
settlers were to receive small plots of land for
subsistence farming and earn wages on
large-scale cooperative farms and community
industries.zz The committee members felt that
such a plan was "too communistic" and determined that each family should receive forty
acres to grow vegetables for the family, feed
for livestock, and cotton as a cash crop for
income beyond that provided by the project's
industrial enterpriseY The committee had
several locations in mind, but selected a 4000
acre site near the town of Ropesville, on the
Spade Ranch lands in neighboring Hockley
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FIG. 4. Charlie Ward (project client) in front of his homestead, 1938. Courtesy Southwest Collection, Texas
Tech University, Lubbock, Texas. Photo Collection #61.

County, because Lubbock County was nearing the cotton quota set by the Bankhead
Cotton Control Act of 1934.24 The location,
however, was one of very few decisions made
by the committee that was included in the
project's final design. The committee's plan,
never fully endorsed by FERA officials, was
eliminated from consideration when the RA
took control of the FERA projects on 1 May
1935. 25
FORTY ACRES, DUST BOWL, AND THE
CASE OF FARMER A. JUDD

Walter Prescott Webb concluded that the
story of white settlement west of the Cross
Timbers was one of environmental conquest.
Webb believed that those settlers who crossed

the ninety-eighth meridian conquered their
new environment and adapted it to settlement
with inventions such as barbed wire, windmills, and six-shooters. These adaptations included larger farms and implements designed
to conserve the limited precipitation of the
Great Plains. Webb asserted that farming the
Plains required "big machines, strong horsepower, and rapid work. This means that farming in the Great Plains is done on a much
larger scale than elsewhere, not because the
West wants to be different, but because it must
if it is to have any measure of prosperity."26
Although the average annual rainfall in
Lubbock often fell below the twenty inches
per year necessary for general dry-farming purposes, the Local Advisory Committee was reluctant to admit that Webb's adaptations were
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FIG. 5. Clearing land on the Project (WPA labor), 1936. Courtesy Southwest Collection, Texas Tech
University, Lubbock, Texas. Photo Collection #61.

necessary. Their reluctance was not derived
from ignorance or a stubborn devotion to farming methods developed over centuries in more
hospitable climates. To admit that the South
Plains required extreme adaptations would
have been tantamount to admitting that their
Ropesville Plans were impractical.
To promote the project locally, A. B. Davis
scheduled speaking engagements at local civic
clubs such as Rotary and Kiwanis throughout
February and March of 1934. Lubbockites applauded the idea of a farm project, and the
Local Advisory Committee's plan was largely
accepted except for the size of the individual
farm units. As Davis explained,
Our plan calls for forty acres ... Instead of
having one family on 160 acres, if we have
four families on 160 acres, each of them

making a better living, thereby having a
higher plane of living than the average family has on 160 acres, business will be multiplied four times as a result of this
demonstration. 27
The increase in business that Davis hoped
would result from the Ropesville demonstration obviously appealed to Lubbock merchants, but he did not clarify how a smaller
acreage would place project farmers on "a
higher plane of living." He did not inform
his audiences of the FERA's rural-industrial
concept or the committee's modification of
it into a balance between community industry and independent farming. Davis instead
provided the cost and production records of
a local vegetable farmer named A. Judd, included in the committee's application to the
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FERA, to demonstrate how small farming
might be practiced profitably in the region. 2s
When Garnet Reeves, publicity manager
for the Lubbock Chamber of Commerce, interviewed Mr. Judd during February 1934, Judd
reported that his 1933 net income from just
fifteen acres of vegetables was more than
$2300, or approximately $150 per acre. 29 The
committee estimated that project farmers
could earn up to $259 per acre from vegetables,
an estimate Davis deemed conservative. 30 Admitting that the regional market could only
support a limited number of vegetable farmers, the committee determined that only three
acres could be planted in vegetables per project
unit, which would provide approximately $ 777
per year ($259 per acre) in income. Twenty
acres would be planted in cotton, which, they
estimated, would provide another $500 per
year. The balance of the forty acres would be
planted in feed for livestockY Although Davis
used Judd's farm as an example of how small,
diversified farming could succeed, a significant part of Judd's interview with Reeves was
omitted from the committee's application to
the Texas Rural Communities and Davis's talk
to Lubbock civic clubs. The success of Judd's
fifteen acres of vegetables was insured by a
$2000 irrigation unit capable of pumping 600
gallons of water per minute from an eighty-four
foot well, a technological innovation on the
South Plains. 32
The committee's report implies that Judd
was indebted to nothing more than the benevolence of the South Plains soil for his success. Irrigation, like larger acreages, was an
adaptation peculiar to arid and semiarid regions, and to admit that such an adaptation
was necessary, or even beneficial, would have
meant that South Plains rainfall was unsuitable for small-scale farming, so the committee consistently opposed irrigation. Some of
their objections were reasonable. They suggested that an "irrigated undertaking" would
fail because one hundred families with enough
experience to farm successfully with irrigation could not be found on the South Plains.
The availability of ground water in quanti-

ties necessary for irrigation was uncertain in
the 1930s and committee members feared reduction of the ground water supplyY Less reasonably, however, the committee members
argued that mechanized irrigation was simply
unnecessary. In the committee's original application to Texas Rural Communities, they
asserted that "no irrigation is needed for general farming on the South Plains," but suggested that abundant water was available to
project families wanting to irrigate gardens
from windmills. 34
Unlike tl;le Lubbock Local Advisory Committee, officials of the Plainview Chamber of
Commerce believed that a federally funded
resettlement project was the ideal way to demonstrate the practicability and profitability of
farming with mechanized irrigation on the
South Plains. In 1935 the Plainview Chamber
submitted an application that was virtually
identical to Lubbock's with one significant
difference-the Plainview project was based
on the use of mechanized irrigation. According to the Plainview application, "it has been
proven time and time again in this section
that average and even large families can make
a good living, school their children, and have
virtually all the modern conveniences, on an
irrigated tract of forty acres."35 In Plainview,
an area one civic booster labeled the "land of
the underground rain," irrigation was considered a positive and progressive way to protect
crops from drought, keep down blowing dirt,
and cultivate the millions of unplowed acres
on the South Plains. The Lubbock committee, on the other had, felt that insufficient
rainfall was a greater liability than irrigation
was a benefit.
Whether or not state and federal officials
saw through the use ofJudd's cost and production estimates, the committee's size limitations
were quickly eliminated as plans for the project
advanced through 1934 and 1935. That the
plans were accepted at all was probably more
a result of Knapp's position as chairman of
the Texas Rural Communities Board of Directors than any confidence federal officials
had in their success. The committee offered a
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compromise of sixty acres per unit, but federal
officials felt that the plan was not well suited
to the South Plains climate. The extra income
the committee members hoped the settlers
would earn from growing vegetables was eliminated from the project's design when Adam
R. Johnson, Texas Rural Communities manager and author of the state report to the FERA
concerning the Ropesville Project, wrote that
the "comparatively short growing season and
the climatic conditions together with the opportunity for specialized cropping make [the
South Plainslless adaptable to diversified agriculture than most places."36
After the Resettlement Administration
(RA) took over the project in May 1935, state
and local agencies involved with projects progressively losttheir authority. In August 1935,
W. B. Orr, assistant manager of the Texas Rural
Communities, reported to the Local Advisory
Committee that the RA had determined that
each unit should be 120 acres. Davis reported
this change to farm reporter Victor Schoffelmayer, who published the committee's complaints in the Dallas Morning News and later in
a collection of essays entitled The South Plains
of Texas Historic"al Sketches. According to
Schoffelmayer the RA's decision on farm unit
sizes brought a "storm of protest" from the
Local Advisory Committee, the type of protest "peculiar to Plainsmen when they feel their
section is misunderstood."37 The committee
primarily objected to the increase in unit size
to 120 acres. Davis complained,
a large number of units of approximately
sixty acres each will enable a farmer to make
a better living than the large average now
makes on 160 acres .... Hell, any and everybody who knows anything about this
country knows that any intelligent farmer,
properly started out and capitalized, can
make a good living on 120 acres on the
South Plains of Texas. 38
Once again, Davis did not clarify how families
were going to make more on less acreage. Neither Davis' letter nor Schoffelmayer's article

made specific mention of the decentralized
rural factories that were the ultimate goal of
the members of the Local Advisory Committee. Davis concluded that the original purposes of the project, to demonstrate the
benefits of settlement on the South Plains and
to stimulate regional development through intensive land colonization, were "completely
lost under the 120 acre plan."39 Despite objections, the Ropesville Project's final plans included 120 acre limits. When the first
thirty-three families moved on to the project
in January of 1936, some of the homes had to
be disassembled and moved to accommodate
the final unit size of an average of 165 cultivable acres. 40 The committee members, like
many other local officials throughout the
country, blamed RA administrator R. G.
Tugwel1. 41
Throughout his career, Tugwell was criticized for his outspoken and left-leaning economic philosophy. The RA did not follow the
committee's plan because Tugwell felt the
rural-industrial communities concept was
flawed. Although Roosevelt had assigned the
Division of Subsistence Homesteads and the
FERA's Rural Rehabilitation Division to the
RA in 1935, Tugwell considered them a burdensome liability, impractical programs forced
on the RA for the sake of administrative efficiencyY Tugwell did not believe that industry could be lured into rural areas. While
programs could keep some farmers on the land
and help to alleviate rural poverty, most of
the displaced poor would be forced to move to
the cities. As he said in 1935, "we must be
prepared to absorb very large numbers of persons from farms into our general industrial and
urban life ... subsistence homestead projects
will function merely as eddies of retreat for
exceptional persons."43
The practicability of the committee's plan
was cast into doubt by the voluminous research conducted by New Deal agencies, the
Department of Agriculture, and the Department of the Interior following the drought
emergency on the Great Plains in the 1930s.
This research was summarized in a 1936 report
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by the president's Great Plains Committee,
prominent officials from seven federal agencies. This report, The Future of the Great Plains,
concluded that "unless there was a permanent
change in the agricultural pattern on the
Plains, relief always would have to be extended
whenever the available rainfall was deficient."
The committee concluded that unwise agricultural practices on the Great Plains were
responsible for the severe wind erosion and
land deterioration of the Dust Bowl period,
but "careful planning [and] fewer and larger
farms on scientifically selected sites" would
help to restore the land to provide a comfortable and consistent living for a limited number of farmers and ranchers. Farm sizes would
have to increase and the number of farms to
decrease. 44 The practical experience of men
involved with the Ropesville Project confirmed the findings of the Great Plains Committee. For example, C. P. Blackwell, Assistant
Regional Director of the Land Utilization Division of the RA, who owned more than a
half-section of land on the South Plains, informed Davis in December of 1935 that "with
thirty years of farming experience in that section to my credit, I would have to discount
many of your calculations because I own a
farm of 330 acres which has not produced
enough in the past five years to pay the
taxes."45
Although the extended drought decimated
the South Plains agricultural economy, the
committee insisted that the drought and the
dust storms were temporary inconveniences
and that rain would inevitably return. They
were aware of the problems landowners like
Blackwell were having but they, particularly
A. B. Davis, were consistently optimistic about
the future of the South Plains. Davis's protest
of the Federal Land Bank appraisal in March
1935 reveals his optimism. The appraiser included the Lubbock area in the "extended 1934
drouth [sic] area" but Davis insisted to officials of the FERA and later to the RA that this
was misleading. Including the information
about low rainfall was unfair because the
"drought of 1934 was not confined to this area.
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It was nation wide, in fact, it was world wide.
No one knows what the future will be."46
Donald Worster has characterized the Dust
Bowl as a region that had borders as "inexact
and shifting as a sand-dune." Whether or not
the South Plains area can be included in what
became known as the Dust Bowl is uncertain.
Lubbock was on the southern fringe of the
area the SCS defined as having suffered from
"severe wind erosion" between 1935 and
1938.47 Whether or not the region could be
considered part of the Dust Bowl was a matter
of perspective. Most farmers in the region probably thought the label accurate. Maureen
Condra and her son Frank, residents of the
Ropesville Project, recalled a midday duster
in 1938 that filled their house with dust so
thick and black they were blinded beyond an
arm's length. To protect her children from
suffocating, Mrs. Condra placed wet rags over
their noses while they slept. Lillian Willis recalled her husband going out on horseback to
roundup livestock after a storm had drifted
dust dunes over the fences on land northwest
of Lubbock now owned by Texas Tech University. Viedna Darby recalled her husband
getting lost on the way back from the outhouse, blinded by the blowing dirt. 48 While
storms like this frequented the Lubbock area
throughout the 1930s, the Local Advisory
Committee made every effort to disassociate
the South Plains from the Dust Bowl label.
In an effort to "stay out of the Dust Bowl,"
the committee initiated another "storm of protest" when RA officials decided to transfer the
Ropesville Project to RA Region Twelve, with
headquarters in Amarillo, from Region Eight,
which was headquartered in Dallas. 49 The
c·ommittee felt that Region Twelve was associated with the Dust Bowl while farms and
crops around Lubbock were completely different. R. P. Trent, administrator of Region
Eight, informed Tugwell that the Local Advisory Committee felt the appropriate dividing line between Regions Eight and Twelve
should extend from the southwest corner of
Oklahoma along the northern boundaries of
those counties immediately north of Lubbock
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because "the country south of the line is not
seriously affected by wind erosion, dust storms,
etc., and is not characteristic of the rest of the
dust bowl."50 The original boundary remained,
down the length of the ninety-eighth meridian and west along the southern edge of the
Llano Estacado. The decision to transfer
Ropesville to Region Twelve was probably
made for administrative efficiency, since
Amarillo was a little more than two hours drive
away while Dallas was about six. Then there
was the fact that L. H. Hauter, director of the
Amarillo office of the RA, had visited Lubbock in April of 1936 during a dust storm, a
common occurrence in Lubbock during the
spring time. This particular storm, according
to Garnet Reeves, hit Lubbock like a "slap in
the face"-as did Hauter's speech. He began
his talk by saying sarcastically, as Reeves noted,
that he was "glad to come down here to Lubbock where you don't have any dust."51 The
project was transferred to Region Eight effective 1 October 1936. 52
The local advisory committee was aware of
how harsh the South Plains climate could be,
but they refused to concede that dust storms
and drought were anything more than temporary inconveniences. Otherwise their plans
were impractical, and to them the Ropesville
Project was not a relief measure but an advertisement for the benefits of farm settlement
on the South Plains. Drought and dust were
not incentives for settlers, and the committee, believing in the regenerative powers of
the land, were exasperated by the opinion of
RA officials. As A. B. Davis informed the
members of the Local Advisory Committee, "I
still have some hopes of our doing something
with the Ropesville Project [but] ... all too
many of those in authority just don't believe
in this country. They speak of it as being a
country of 'low rainfall.' They just can't get it
out of their heads that this is not a desert."53
"STRICTLY INDIGENOUS AMERICAN LINES"

The Lubbock Chamber of Commerce did
not wish to consider any negative aspects of

the South Plains climate nor any political,
social, or economic issues that prospective
settlers, land owners, or industrial investors
could construe as negative. Committee members believed the Ropesville Project could
begin to revolutionize agriculture on the South
Plains, but they endeavored not to deviate
from traditional, conservative American
norms or to allow federal officials to do so.
The committee members sought to disassociate the project from the economic left and to
limit project costs, so as to avoid the negative
attention other community projects were receiving for excessive spending.
Much of the support for the Ropesville
Project came from Colonel Lawrence Westbrook, the original administrator of the FERA
in Texas and later assistant administrator of
the agency under Harry Hopkins. Westbrook
wanted the FERA rural resettlement communities to resemble the communal villages established in the United States by Northern
European immigrants. He believed these immigrant communities had "almost invariably
... managed to get by without having to go on
relief" because the members cooperated. 54 The
FERA plan called for a small subsistence plot
for each family combined with wage work on
large communal farms and in cooperative industrial enterprises. 55 Unlike "crackpot economic or social panaceas," FERA communities
were to make families "self sustaining by an
investment in equipment and supplies which
would not exceed the cost of extending relief
over a period of several months."56
Westbrook's ideas about communal village
life and cooperative farming carried the leftist
tinge the committee wanted to avoid. As Davis
wrote Victor Schoffelmayer, the members of
the committee "just did not believe the community or cooperative thing would work with
worthwhile Americans-it was too communistic."57 Davis insisted on not being quoted,
but Schoffelmayer agreed with him, stating
that Ropesville was to "be operated on strictly
indigenous American lines, provided that the
federal planning administration will incorporate some of the advice of the South Plains
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special committee."58 Individual family farms,
not cooperative farms or subsistence homesteads, were what the committee sought for
the "young, pioneer, independent stock" that
would be moving into the farmsteads at
Ropesville. 59
Because of the "communistic" implications
of cooperative or communal projects, most
New Deal communities, including Ropesville,
were designed from the beginning for individual family farms. Only four farm communities operated by the RA and its successor the
Farm Security Administration (FSA) might
have been appropriately labeled cooperative
or communal, in that each farmer had a small
subsistence plot and the community as a whole
worked a large commercial plot. These four,
however, received much attention from reporters and congressmen dismayed by the
possibility of leftist "encroachments."6o
In Texas, the target for anti-leftist suspicions
was the Woodlake Community near Houston,
which seemed to represent all that was "unAmerican" about the New Deal community
program. Writing for The Farmer Stockman
Clarence Roberts suggested that Woodlake
ruined the lives of men and their families because the good houses and steady work were
not worth the embarrassment of "complete
dependence on the government."61 Several
Ropesville committee members visited the
Woodlake Project, but according to Davis it
was the antithesis of what they wanted to accomplish on the South Plains. 62
The Ropesville committee also wanted to
avoid Woodlake's high costs and demonstrate
how inexpensive farm settlement on the South
Plains could be. When the March 1935 "Application for Approval" to the FERA for the
Ropesville Project showed little resemblance
to the committee's plan, the Chamber of Commerce forwarded a copy to Dean Leidigh of
the Division of Agriculture at Texas Tech.
Leidigh scribbled corrections in the margins
and slashed through figures and tables in a
bold, impatient cursive. Underneath the total
estimate of $4886.07 for land and homes
Leidigh wrote "too damn much!" In the mar-

gin beside the itemized list of construction,
implement, livestock, and startup costs he
wrote "change all this." The dean slashed all
the estimates, except the cost of land and
barns, reducing the total cost for beginning
operations, including land, construction, livestock, and implements, from $5769 to $4411
per unit. 63
These cost reductions brought praise from
the Texas Rural Communities Board of Directors. Dr. R. Benedict, president of the corporation, suggested that the committee was
"entitled to gold buttons" for their endeavorS. 64 Carl Lovelace, a very strong adherent of
the Ropesville Project on the Texas Rural
Communities Board of Advisors, said:

It seems to me we have a very unique situation here, this is the only time the community has ever evinced any interest after
the land was sold . . . . They are putting
their knowledge and experience into [the
Ropesville Projectl-they are not asking us
to spend more-they are asking us to spend
less. 65
To the committee members, particularly
Knapp, the facilities that were to equip most
New Deal communities offended the West
Texas pioneer spirit. Conveniences like indoor plumbing and electricity would deprive
the settlers of the pioneering experience of
most other West Texans. Knapp claimed, "I
am not ashamed to admit that I did not have
a bathroom until long after I was married. I am
willing to bet that nine-tenths of the people
in that country don't have them." He continued that West Texas settlers had "gone out
there into dugouts and made their way ...
That's the thing I feel that we should remember. I don't think we should wire these houses
at all, I wouldn't think of wiring them."66
Sumner A. Wells agreed with Knapp, stating
that placing government clients "on a plane
of living-with a home and improvements
and so forth-far above the farm owning citizens of the section" was fundamentally wrong
and was bound to cause "friction" with their
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neighborsY Lovelace agreed with Knapp, believing that the best plan was the one first
introduced by the Local Advisory Committee: "forty acres and the ordinary conveniences
they are used to ... furnish them with bathtubs, electric lights and a lot of other things
they are not used to and they will never be
able to pull out." Lovelace suggested that a
pioneering experience would have an immeasurable benefit:
I know a little about that country out there.
You go out there and see people living in
dugouts with probably the whole improvements not worth more than two hundred
dollars, and then go back in three or four
years, and they have a nice house. There is
something very beautiful about it. 68
Providing farmers with a higher standard
of living was, however, along with reducing
tenancy and improving land utilization, one
of the fundamental objectives of the New
Deal's rural rehabilitation program. Franklin
Roosevelt declared in 1934 that New Deal
rural rehabilitation would make "country life
every bit as desirable as city life" by providing
rural people with the "necessary advantages
which exist in the cities."69 New Dealers found
nothing beautiful about American farm families living for three or four years in sod dugouts with no plumbing or electricity. Such a
lifestyle was cold, dark, and unsanitary. The
RA was designed to relieve rural poverty and,
to New Dealers, life in a dugout without running water or electric light was poverty-not
pioneering. The homes were built with indoor sinks and a tub, and they were wired by
the Rural Electrification Administration in
1939. 70
The committee insisted that the Ropesville
Project follow "indigenous American lines"
because high costs and "communistic" experiments were unpopular in Texas in the 1930s.
They tried to rid the Ropesville Project of
whatever might attract negative publicity and
disassociated themselves and Lubbock from
the project where it drifted away from the lines

they drew. As A. B. Davis told Frank P. Holland, editor of Farm and Ranch, "very frankly,
we may want [a story] for propaganda purposes-and then again, depending on certain
developments, we may not want a story at all. "71
The Chamber had initiated the Ropesville
Project to inspire large land owners to colonize their own holdings, to attract new settlement by advertising the capabilities of the
South Plains soil, and to create a contented
labor pool of small farmers that would bring
industry to the region. The project was supposed to demonstrate a new, efficient way of
life on the South Plains.

"A CITY, EXTENDING IN EVERY DIRECTION, AND YET IT Is NOT A CITY"
The Local Advisory Committee and the
Lubbock Chamber of Commerce hoped to fill
the South Plains with thousands of families
on small farms. Although they understood it
would be difficult for a family to subsist on
forty or sixty acres of land, committee members were not concerned with making the farms
on the Ropesville Project consistently profitable because they were confident that industry would provide the settlers a steady cash
income. Once the Slaughters, Ellwoods, and
other large ranchers of the region began to
colonize their lands in a similar manner,the
committee members believed the large population of small farmers would attract industry
to the region. The settlers could find wage
work in decentralized rural factories, enjoy the
benefits of a rural lifestyle, and be able to feed
their families when economic downturns came
to the factories. Such industrial development
had some support beyond the committee, as
Davis told S. A. Wells in 1935: "very very
confidentially, the State Planning Board has
experts studying the possibilities of a woolen
mill of some kind in connection with a colony
of something like 1000 families to be built
around the present Ropesville Colony."72
This "woolen mill" was to be the first of
many rural factories that committee members
hoped would one day dot the landscape of the
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South Plains from Plainview to Big Spring and
from Clovis to the Cap rock. Bradford Knapp
wrote an article in 1934 for the fiftieth anniversary edition of the San Angelo Standard
Times prophesying what life might be like in
West Texas in 1984. When he woke from his
imaginary fifty--year nap, he found six million
more people, cars that looked like "animated
turtles," highways without accidents, and
noiseless airplanes. To his surprise Knapp
found, spread out across the Llano Estacado,
"a city, extending in every direction, and yet
it is not a city." It was comprised of "great
groups of smaHfarms with factories in the center." These "factories out in the country [had]
beautiful cottages all around them [with] beautiful curved roads and every house has its garden, its own poultry, and anywhere from three
to five or six acres to support the family."
Knapp was "amazed at the vegetation" and
discovered that "tree conscious" W est Texans
had altered their climate by planting rows of
trees in between fields to control the "blowing
of soils." EquaHy "water conscious" people had
dammed rivers "until the succession of lakes
has almost the appearance of a string of pearls,
glittering in the sunlight along every canyon
and every stream." Industry had become the
lifeblood of West Texas and "only finished
products are exported" from the region, featuring "beautiful fabric of wool, cotton, and
mohair or in new and interesting combinations." Knapp's 1984 was the new way of life
he and the Local Advisory Committee hoped
to begin with the Ropesville Project. 73 Knapp
hoped for a life onthe land that was planned
and rational, that included the benefits of the
modern industrial world without sacrificing
the rural lifestyle-and that was very different
from the agricultural complex that developed
around Lubbock after World War II.
The possibility of a community like that
envisioned by Knapp was eliminated when the
RA took charge of the project in April 1935.
Once it became apparent that Tugwell's RA
"sang low on industrial development," Knapp
and the members of the committee admitted
that an increase in unit size was necessary if
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the farms were going to be profitable. Knapp
wrote Davis on 30 December 1935, two days
before the first settlers moved in, that "when
we began this project it was rather definitely
understood that the small size of the farms
would have to be supplemented by some sort
of a community manufacturing enterprise."
Since the RA was unwilling to support such
an enterprise "the only way to increase the
certainty of each farm paying out was to increase its size." In fact, Knapp suggested that
the biggest asset for farmers in the South Plains
was "the fact that one man with team and
tools can handle more land than in other sections."74
It became apparent that the committee was
no longer involved with the administration of
the project when the RA hired R. D. Jones as
the first community manager. The committee
had asked in June of 1935 to accept applications for the position, had sifted through one
hundred applicants, interviewed several and
had narrowed the field down to three when
the RA sent word that they had already appointed Jones. The Baylor alumnus with some
graduate credits from Yale had been eliminated by the committee early on in the process. 75 By the time the first thirty-three
families moved on to the project in January
1936, the committee members were "practically out of the picture as far as directing the
policies in connection with [Ropesville] is
concerned. "76
Several members of the committee prepared
to resign after the first families moved in. They
were certain the project would fail and, as committee member Don Jones put it, if it should
'''fall flat' this country would be condemned as
far as its agricultural possibilities are concerned." Some of the members hoped the government might expand the number of units
on the project but Spencer Wells would have
won when he offered to "make you a three to
one bet you never get 100 units." When the
settlers bought out the project in 1943 there
were only seventy-six units. Only Bradford
Knapp continued to support the project, regularly visiting the settlers and writing letters to
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government officials on their behalf until his
death in 1938. Knapp was disappointed that
the Ropesville Project would not include industry but was "entirely in favor" of many of
the aims of the RA-particularly its efforts to
stop farm tenancy.77 He believed that fundamental changes were necessary in the economic and social structures of rural America
and that government intervention and regulation were necessary so that the "rights of all
will be protected and preserved" from "the
glorification of the individual." He also felt
that projects like Ropesville were steps toward the "great and overpowering demandthe common good."78 As he wrote Rexford
Tugwell in 1936, "I think that the kind of
thing that has been attempted at Ropesville
could be made the means of converting a large
proportion of the tenants in the South, both
white and Negro, into self-respecting landowners."79
Self respect was at the foundation of the
committee's plans for Ropesville. All were
educated men who were aware that farms, particularly in the South Plains, were growing
larger and fewer. Like New Dealers they were
shocked by the suffering of the Great Depression and their rural backgrounds led them to
conclude that solutions could be found on
the land. Land ownership provided families
with self respect and a sense of independence
that wage labor never could. The committee
members believed that Texans, especially the
"young pioneer stock" of the South Plains,
needed only a decent house and a tract of
fertile soil to lead a satisfying life. 8o
"THE MOST PRACTICAL RESETTLEMENT
PROJECT IN THE NATION"

Even after Tugwell resigned in 1936 and
his Resettlement Administration was replaced
by the Farm Security Administration in 1937,
the New Deal's community projects remained
controversial, as the Local Advisory Committee had feared, because they were expensive
and were thought to be "communistic." Despite these fears, the Ropesville Project at-

tracted little of the negative attention directed
at the New Deal community building program
as a whole. Government officials, journalists,
historians, and the settlers themselves judged
the project a success. Its practical design, the
long term economic benefits it brought to its
settlers, the ability of most settlers to pay their
government loans before they were due, and
the help it provided the seventy-six families
of more than three hundred individuals who
settled on the project all help account for its
success.
Marion Clawson presented the most objective account of Ropesville, comparing it with
eight other FSA projects in January 1943.
Ropesville compared well in every category
to four other individually operated farm
projects and four cooperatives. Its unit cost of
$8431 was third lowest. Ropesville Project
farmers' delinquency rate on loans was very
low, just 22 percent compared to 86 percent
on Wichita Valley Farms and 88 percent on
Osage farms in Missouri. Turnover rates were
also very low; only fourteen families left
Ropesville between 1939 and 1943, while most
of the other projects lost about one third of
their families during the four year period. The
nearby ninety-unit Wichita Valley Project,
for example, lost thirty-four families between
1939 and 1943. By 1940, Ropesville was the
only project that had a positive net return,
$1814. The other projects had negative balances from $913 to $32,217. 81 .
Hearing that Eleanor Roosevelt might visit
Lubbock,· Ropesville residents invited her to
visit "the most practical resettlement project
in the nation."82 The Ropesville Project maintained a reputation of practicality throughout
its history with the FSA (1936-43). Wes Izzard,
writer for the South Plains Farmer, suggested
that the "benevolent supervision" with which
the community manager and his staff administered the Ropesville Project was a "practical
rather than a brain trust management." It was
"emphatically not a cooperative scheme, with
the work and profits shared, that had been
tried on other projects with conspicuous lack
of success."83
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The FSA's "benevolent supervision" may
have contributed to the Ropesville Project's
financial success, but all New Deal community projects were subject to the same supervision and most were considered failures. Many
FSA clients, even on successful projects like
Ropesville, resented government interference
in their day to day lives. Project farmer]. D.
Watts, for example, complained about FSA
supervision in an angry letter to Congressman
George Mahon, asking "is this an American
way of living? ... why send our boys to fight
and die for us if we lose our freedom at home?"
Watts suggested that the government should
"eliminate a half dozen officials or all of them
and [treat] us like we were white American
people. Without a complete record of everything we do we could go on with our farming
and other duties with the peace of mind that
comes from living in a free country."84 In another letter Mrs. L. S. Rosser echoed Watts,
adding:
to have four to six people trying to promote
this and that, drawing a nice salary which is
paid for by every taxpayer in the U.S., seems
to be uncalled for ... why have a group of
people all the time examining [us] and using us to experiment on ... Consider us as
a human being and not as a guinea Pig. 85
Most FSA community projects were designed to resettle families on individual farms,
so Ropesville's not being a "cooperative
scheme" was not unusual and cannot account
for its success. 86 Most FSA community projects
failed because the individual farms were too
small to be profitable and land prices were too
high for the farmers to purchase them. 87 Most
settlers on FSA projects left when they were
able to purchase other farms or when wage
work became plentiful during the war. The
Ropesville Project succeeded in the long run
because land prices were low in the South
Plains. The settlers' original agreement offered
them the eventual opportunity to purchase
their farms. Land values were low and the 165
acre plots were large enough to turn a profit,

so the Ropesville settlers very wisely stayed on
their farms while their counterparts on other
projects were leaving in droves. 88 When the
FSA offered purchase contracts in 1943, all
but seven families purchased their farms. 89
They paid about $6000 each for their farmsteads, or approximately $31.40 per acre, while
the price of land on most other projects was
much higher. 90 At Osage Farms in Missouri,
for example, land values were more than $50
per acre four years before the FSA began offering purchase contracts to settlers. 91 Even with
the strong markets and high prices brought by
World War II, Ropesville farmers probably
would not have been able to afford such a
purchase.
The project's final design was only practical, however, when there was sufficient rainfall. In 1940 Acting Regional Director Wilson
Cowen reported to FSA administrator C. B.
Baldwin that crop yield estimates on the
Ropesville Project were "entirely too optimistic" because they were based on wet years.
Ropesville's impracticality in a dry year is illustrated by comparison with the New Mexico
Farms Project in Fort Sumner. Although net
income on the projects in 1939 was similar,
$752.93 for New Mexico and $689.51 for
Ropesville, farmers on Ropesville received
$789.42 in direct government payments and
FSA loans while those on New Mexico Farms
received just $315.63. Farmers in Fort Sumner,
a similar climate, needed less aid because their
crops were irrigated. 92
The widespread use of mechanized irrigation systems, capable of drawing 800 gallons
per minute from the Ogallala Aquifer, did not
come to the South Plains until the post-war
period. Project farmers were able to convert
to irrigation earlier than their neighbors because they were able to build equity as land
values rose rapidly on the South Plains after
the end of the war. Of twenty-six project families traced through the records of the Hockley
County Courthouse, half had taken out materials and mechanic's liens on their property to
install pumping plants prior to 1949. Eight of
the other thirteen families had already sold
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their farms, three had pumping plants installed
prior to 1955, and two either did not install
irrigation systems or did not borrow to do SO.93
Between 1945 and 1950, just 37 percent of
Hockley County farmers had converted to irrigation. The average size of these farms in
1950 was 388.6 acres under cultivation, compared to the 165 for former project farmers.
The project farmers were good credit risks
because the land for which they had paid $6000
in 1943 was worth about $16,000 in 1950. 94
While their neighbors were paying off debts
from previous decades, going into debt to buy
land, or going out of business, project farmers
owned their land or had relatively little debt.
Thirty-one of seventy-six project farmers had
paid off their loans and owned their land by
1947. 95 Besides irrigation systems, project farmers were able to make further improvements
on homes, purchase automobiles, and buy farm
equipment like tractors and combines. The
project farmers were one step ahead of their
competitors as the South Plains evolved into
the giant cotton factory it is today. In 1993, a
half century after they were purchased,
thirty-six of the Ropesville Project farms were
still owned by project family members.96
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